The Security, Social and Economic Risks of Reporting Corruption in PNG: The Struggle Between Hope and Pessimism

Corruption resembles a crisis of governance that undermines national integrity systems. However, it ‘differs in degree, prevalence, lack of sanctions’, and varies between different sociocultural contexts.[i] The two most used definitions of corruption are the abuse (or misuse) of public office for private gain (World Bank 1997)[ii] and the abuse (or misuse) of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International n.d.).[iii] In Papua New Guinea (PNG), corruption is widespread and is found in clientelist practices such as gift-giving, cronyism, bribery, nepotism, and pork barrelling.[iv] Despite decades of anti-corruption reforms and interventions in PNG, the fight against corruption has so far proven to be ineffective.[v] Being the largest of the Pacific Island Countries and resource rich, decades of resource plundering and siphoning of national wealth have left its economy as well as its socio-economic, and health indicators in an appalling state.  Observers have suggested that state capture can be seen in PNG in large resource-extraction projects such as the petroleum and logging industries, which are dominated by select foreign interests licensed by the state.[vi]

Papua New Guinea’s record of managing corruption has been poor. This discussion paper will explore recent research (2020) on public sector corruption in PNG. The research consisted of 83 participants, including government and private sector employees, retired senior public servants, university students, and informal sector vendors, all of whom are citizens of PNG. The research found that public sector corruption in PNG is institutionalised, and has been a constant source of much of the citizenry’s complaints about lack of service delivery and development. Niney-nine per cent of the people interviewed found that corruption is either problematic or highly problematic in the public sector (Table 1). In addition, 62 per cent of respondents believed that most public servants have received bribes or kickbacks in one form or another through informal exchanges, while 52 per cent thought that most members of parliament (MPs) have been bribed by businesses or firms for political favours (Table 1).[vii]

Table 1: Overview of corruption in Papua New Guinea’s public sector

Public sector corruption		Bribery in the public sector		Bribery involving MPs
Scale	%	Scale	%	Scale	%
Highly problematic	75	All	7	All	23
Problematic	24	Most	62	Most	52
Less problematic	1	Some	31	Some	25
Not problematic	0	None	0	None	0

Source: Survey and Focus Group Discussion data collected from PNG citizens between March and June 2020.

Papua New Guinea’s corruption perception indexes (CPI) based on Transparency International’s public sector survey in the last five years (2021 and 2025) have not made much progress, as Table 2 attests.

Table 2: CPI scores and ranking for PNG (2020-2024)

Country: Papua New Guinea Region: Asia-Pacific
Year	CPI score (/100)	Rank (/180 countries)
2020	27	142
2021	31	124
2022	30	130
2023	29	133
2024	31	127

Source: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024

Papua New Guinea (PNG) stands at a crossroads in its struggle against corruption. For decades successive governments, donors, and civil society actors have invested in building an anti-corruption regime that includes a dense network of institutions, watchdog bodies, and legislation. From the Ombudsman Commission and Leadership Code to the more recent Organic Law on the Independent Commission Against Corruption (OLICAC) and the Whistleblower Act 2020, PNG has developed an extensive legal architecture intended to confront corruption head-on.

Yet despite these efforts, citizen confidence and trust in the political and government system remains frail. Corruption continues to undermine the integrity of governance, distort service delivery, hinder economic growth, and erode public trust in democratic institutions. Central to this dilemma is the paradox of corruption reporting: citizens recognize the value of reporting and overwhelmingly believe it can generate positive change, yet they also fear the profound social, economic, and security risks associated with doing so.

This discussion paper explores this tension, i.e. the struggle between hope and pessimism, drawing from empirical evidence gathered from surveys and focus groups with Papua New Guineans. It argues that the risks of reporting corruption are not merely individual but extend to broader security concerns in PNG and the Pacific. The paper situates these risks in the context of Melanesian social systems, weak institutional enforcement, and the fragility of democratic accountability. It concludes with reflections on policy implications for PNG and lessons for regional partners in the Pacific. This tension draws from collective action and principal-agent problems, two important theories used in corruption studies.[viii] The principal-agent theory argues that corruption occurs due to the ‘principal’s (e.g. citizens) inability to monitor the actions of their delegated ‘agent’ (e.g. politicians, civil servants, regulators, public contractors, etc.). [ix] Collective action problems exist when everyone who be better off if most people acted honestly and in the best interests of the collective, but each individual also has an incentive to act corruptly because they expect others to do the same. To study the collective action problem in PNG, Peiffer and Walton (2018) used anti-corruption messages as a means of awareness raising about the detrimental effects of corruption. [x]

The following section reports the results of data collected between March and June 2020.  Nuances about principal-agent and collection action problems are discussed below, particularly with reporting corrupt acts, and the benefits or consequences of reporting, or not reporting corruption.

1. Corruption Reporting in PNG: Hopeful Aspirations

Despite living in a political environment often described as clientelist and fragile, many Papua New Guineans retain hope that reporting corruption can make a difference. Survey data reveal that citizens strongly associate reporting with improvements in governance, service delivery, economic performance, and democratic quality.

When asked whether they would report corrupt conduct by different actors including family members, friends, public servants, and politicians, most respondents answered positively. For example, 85 percent stated they would report corrupt public servants, and 80 percent said they would report politicians and businesspersons. These figures reflect a widespread belief that corruption is harmful not only to personal welfare but to the collective wellbeing of the nation.

The motivations for reporting are primarily moral and ethical. Citizens often invoked principles of fairness, integrity, and responsibility to uphold ethical standards to justify their willingness to report corruption. Reporting was seen as a means of teaching wrongdoers a lesson, deterring future misconduct, and protecting the reputation of families, businesses, and public institutions. Equally important, respondents linked reporting corruption to systemic benefits such as improved governance, fairness in service delivery, economic growth, and strengthening of democratic institutions. 

Governance: Transparency, Accountability, and Respect for Rules

Citizens consistently emphasized that reporting corruption could enhance governance by promoting transparency and accountability. In PNG, governance is often weakened by the capture of state institutions by political elites, discretionary decision-making, and informal networks of patronage. Respondents noted that when corrupt practices are reported, it forces public servants, politicians, and institutions to operate more openly, reducing opportunities for abuse of power.

Reporting was seen by public servants as a mechanism that instils fear of exposure among officials, creating an environment in which rules and codes of conduct are respected. For instance, respondents argued that when citizens report cases of public servants misusing funds or resources, it not only penalizes the individual but also sets an example for others. By making corruption more visible, reporting was believed to restore integrity to public offices and strengthen citizens’ trust in government systems.

At a systemic level, citizens linked reporting with reinforcing the principles of the rule of law. When ordinary people participate in holding leaders accountable, governance transitions from being elite driven to more participatory. In PNG’s fragile democratic setting, such citizen engagement is vital for curbing the dominance of “big men” politics and creating a governance culture anchored in transparency.

Service delivery: Restoring Fairness and Efficiency

Citizens argued that corruption undermines basic service provision, and reporting can restore fairness in distribution of public services. One of the most immediate areas where citizens see the effects of corruption is in service delivery. Health services, education, infrastructure, and local development projects are frequently undermined by misappropriation, nepotism, and clientelism. Respondents argued that reporting corruption could correct these distortions by ensuring that resources are distributed based on need rather than political or personal connections.

For example, participants explained that when leaders divert public funds for personal gain or allocate projects only to their supporters, communities outside these networks are left behind. Reporting such practices was viewed as a way of restoring fairness, ensuring that all citizens have equitable access to services regardless of political allegiance or kinship ties.

Moreover, respondents connected reporting with improving efficiency. They argued that when officials fear exposure, they are more likely to perform their duties effectively, leading to better delivery of goods and services. This aligns with broader governance theory, which suggests that accountability mechanisms reduce leakages and waste in service delivery systems.[xi]

The belief that reporting can strengthen service delivery also reflects citizens’ everyday frustrations. In rural areas, where the absence of clinics, roads, and schools is keenly felt, the link between corruption and lack of economic development and investment in public infrastructure is direct and visible. Reporting was therefore seen not only as an act of civic responsibility but also as a pathway to tangible improvements in people’s lives.

Economy: Preserving Public Funds and Stimulating Growth

Respondents believed that curbing corruption would bring economic benefits by attracting foreign investment, preserving public funds, and stimulating economic growth. Many argued that corruption diverts scarce resources away from development priorities and deters both domestic and foreign investment. Reporting corruption, therefore, was believed to contribute to financial stability, efficiency in resource allocation, and broader economic growth.

At the micro level, citizens noted that reporting could prevent the misuse of funds in local projects, thereby ensuring money reaches its intended purpose. At the macro level, respondents believed that consistent reporting would help PNG build a reputation for transparency, which is critical for attracting international investors. PNG’s vast resource wealth in mining, oil, and gas has the potential to drive prosperity, but investors remain wary of corruption risks. Citizens perceived reporting as a tool for rebuilding trust in the country’s economic governance.

Furthermore, respondents highlighted the multiplier effect of preventing corruption. If public money is preserved, it can be reinvested into infrastructure, education, and health, which are critical sectors that generate long-term socio-economic growth. By contrast, tolerating corruption drains public finances, limits service delivery, and perpetuates cycles of poverty.

Although citizens acknowledged that reporting alone cannot solve structural economic problems, they viewed it as an essential first step in safeguarding national resources and enabling sustainable growth.

Democracy: Strengthening Institutions and Accountability

Finally, respondents saw reporting corruption as central to strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring leaders remain accountable. For many Papua New Guineans, democracy is not simply about periodic elections but about the ability of citizens to hold leaders accountable between electoral cycles. Reporting corruption was viewed as one of the most direct ways citizens could exercise democratic responsibility.

Respondents emphasized that exposing corruption reinforces the principle that no one is above the law, including politicians. In a political culture where Members of Parliament are often perceived as untouchable due to their economic and social power, reporting was seen as a way of equalizing the relationship between citizens and their leaders.

Participants also linked reporting to the consolidation of democratic institutions. By engaging oversight bodies such as the Ombudsman Commission, ICAC, or the courts, citizens reinforce the legitimacy and authority of these institutions. In the long run, consistent reporting can strengthen the checks and balances that are essential for democracy to function.

Moreover, reporting was perceived to cultivate a politically conscious citizenry. Respondents explained that when communities take action against corruption, they become more informed and engaged in the political process. This can translate into more active participation in elections, civic activism, and demands for policy reform.

In short, citizens regarded reporting as a democratic act, i.e. an expression of agency that affirms their role as co-guardians of the state. At the same time, they recognized that democracy is undermined when fear, retaliation, or weak institutions prevent citizens from speaking out.

This hopeful narrative underscores a deep reservoir of civic aspiration. Papua New Guineans want a political system that works and are prepared, in principle, to confront wrongdoing. However, these aspirations are tempered by a sobering reality: the act of reporting corruption carries real and often severe risks.

2. The Security, Social, and Economic Risks of Reporting

Security Risks: Fear of Retaliation

The most significant deterrent to reporting is fear of retaliation. Citizens consistently expressed concern that exposing corruption, especially when it involves powerful figures like politicians or businesspersons, could invite retribution. This could take the form of physical violence, intimidation, or harassment, often extended to family members.

The weakness of protective mechanisms exacerbates this fear. Although the Whistleblower Act 2020 and Section 104 of the OLICAC provide for witness protection, participants doubted their effectiveness, citing limited enforcement and lack of resources. As one respondent observed, “There is no guarantee that whistleblowers will be safe. What will I gain from being a good citizen if my safety won’t be guaranteed?”

This sense of vulnerability reflects broader insecurities in PNG, where law enforcement agencies are often underfunded, politicized, or complicit in corruption. In such an environment, citizens rationally conclude that reporting corruption may endanger, rather than protect, their households.

Social Risks: Kinship and the Wantok System

Melanesian societies are deeply rooted in kinship structures and the wantok system, where loyalty to family and community is paramount. Reporting corruption committed by a relative or close friend is not merely a legal choice but a profound social dilemma.

Survey data illustrate this tension: while 61 percent of respondents said they would report a corrupt family member, a significant 39 percent would tolerate such behaviour. Many justified tolerance on the grounds of loyalty, dependency, and fear of social exclusion. Some argued that reporting a breadwinner could jeopardize the survival of the household. Others believed family disputes resulting from whistleblowing could escalate into conflict, damaging social cohesion.

This highlights a paradox: citizens recognize that tolerating corruption undermines governance and democracy, yet cultural obligations to kinship often outweigh civic duty. In effect, the wantok system becomes both a safety net and a barrier to accountability.

Economic Risks: Livelihood and Dependency

Corruption reporting is also entangled with economic insecurity. Many respondents feared that exposing a corrupt relative or employer would jeopardize their livelihood, cutting off the only available source of income. In contexts where formal employment is scarce and subsistence economies prevail, the immediate cost of reporting can appear far greater than the long-term benefits of accountability.

For instance, public officials who are business partners with private operators acknowledged that they might tolerate corruption, particularly involving procurement of public contracts to protect their business interests. Some participants admitted they would only report corruption if it directly harmed their business or if they were excluded from its benefits. Such views underscore the economic calculations embedded in decisions about reporting.

Together, these security, social, and economic risks create a powerful disincentive to act against corruption, despite widespread recognition of its harms.

The Dynamics of Tolerating Corruption

Tolerance of corruption is not passive resignation but a strategic adaptation to risk. Citizens often weigh the costs of reporting against the likelihood of institutional response. Where justice systems are perceived as corrupt or ineffective, reporting is seen as futile.[xii]

Participants repeatedly expressed cynicism about PNG’s judiciary, police, and other watchdog agencies. Many noted that cases reported to the Ombudsman Commission or police often stall, files go missing, or perpetrators escape accountability due to political influence. In such an environment, tolerating corruption becomes a rational response to institutional weakness.

Yet the consequences of tolerance are severe. Respondents acknowledged that concealing corruption contributes to governance breakdown, weakens service delivery, undermines economic growth, and accelerates democratic decay. Tolerance perpetuates a cycle where corruption becomes normalized, institutions erode further, and citizen pessimism deepens.

Community Action, Civil Society, and Institutional Weakness

An important finding is that while many individuals express willingness to report corruption, collective action remains weak. Respondents emphasized the need for community mobilization, civic awareness, and stronger engagement from NGOs. Cross-country studies showed that when collective action and anticorruption advocacy are actively pursued at the grassroots level, it strengthens governance and accountability mechanisms. For instance, in Bangladesh, anti-corruption initiatives through spontaneous individual and collective involvement at the local level have an impact on creating accountability and transparency.[xiii]

Civil society organizations like Transparency International Papua New Guinea have been active in advocacy and awareness-raising, but their reach is limited, especially in rural areas where most citizens live.[xiv] Respondents highlighted the lack of education and awareness about how to report corruption, where to report, and what protections exist. Without this knowledge, many feel powerless.

Institutional weaknesses compound these challenges. The Ombudsman Commission, once regarded as a cornerstone of accountability, is underfunded and centralized in Port Moresby, leaving large rural populations without access. Other watchdog bodies suffer similar constraints.

This gap between citizen will and institutional capacity reflects a structural weakness in PNG’s anti-corruption regime. Until citizens are assured that their actions will produce tangible results and protection, community-based accountability will remain limited.[xv]

3. The Role of Law and Policy: Between Symbolism and Enforcement

PNG has no shortage of anti-corruption laws. Yet citizens perceive them as symbolic rather than transformative. The establishment of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was initially greeted with optimism, but many now doubt its independence and enforcement capacity.

Participants stressed that ICAC must be insulated from political interference and equipped with prosecutorial powers to be effective. Without these safeguards, it risks becoming another under-resourced body unable to confront entrenched corruption.

Similarly, the Whistleblower Act 2020 was welcomed as a step forward but has failed to convince citizens of their safety. Many see it as “a law without teeth.” This perception reflects a broader pattern in PNG where laws exist in abundance but are inconsistently implemented, eroding public trust.

4. The Struggle Between Hope and Pessimism

At the heart of this discussion lies a profound ambivalence. Citizens simultaneously embody hope and pessimism, hope that reporting can spark systemic change, and pessimism that the system will protect them when they act.

This duality has serious implications for PNG’s security. When citizens retreat into silence out of fear, corruption flourishes unchecked, fuelling inequality, grievances, and instability. Conversely, when citizens take risks to report without adequate protection, they may provoke reprisals that escalate local insecurity.

For the Pacific region, PNG’s struggle is instructive. As the largest Pacific Island state, with significant resource wealth and strategic importance, PNG’s governance trajectory influences regional security. As one study shows, natural resource-rich developing countries are cursed by their natural resource abundance, particularly petroleum and minerals because colonially- contrived laws influenced development and extraction of resources, and wealth-sharing ratio between the developer, the state and the resource owners.[xvi] Such legal loopholes lead to   widespread corruption, and if left unchallenged, risks undermining state legitimacy, deterring investment, and creating vulnerabilities exploitable by transnational actors.

5. Policy Implications and Recommendations

To bridge the gap between hope and pessimism, policy responses must prioritize protection, empowerment, and institutional reform. The following recommendations emerge from this study:

Strengthen Whistleblower Protection

While the Whistleblower Act 2020 represents an important milestone in PNG’s anti-corruption regime, its promise remains largely unrealized due to limited enforcement and insufficient resourcing. Implementation requires not only public awareness campaigns but also the allocation of dedicated funding to ensure that reports are received, investigated, and acted upon swiftly. Training programs for public officials and law enforcement are equally critical to ensure consistent application of the law across agencies. Without tangible enforcement, the Act risks being dismissed as yet another symbolic reform with little practical effect.[xvii]

Fear of reprisal remains the single most significant deterrent to reporting corruption. To address this, PNG needs an independent, well-funded unit dedicated to witness protection. This unit should have authority to provide physical protection, temporary relocation, and legal support to whistleblowers and their families. Independence is critical: protection mechanisms must be insulated from political interference or manipulation by powerful elites. Such a body could operate under the ICAC umbrella but with its own operational autonomy, signalling to citizens that their security is a national priority.[xviii]

Build Community-Based Accountability Coalitions

Community-level awareness is essential in a country where the majority of citizens live in rural areas and may lack knowledge about formal reporting channels. Civil society organizations and local NGOs are often best placed to deliver targeted outreach in vernacular languages, contextualized to local cultural realities. Providing them with funding, training, and logistical support can amplify their reach, including knowing their rights under the law. Partnerships between NGOs, churches, youth groups, and women’s associations can also broaden the impact of anti-corruption campaigns.[xix]

One way to counteract the risks of whistleblowing is through collective action. When communities act as groups through actions such as lodging petitions, demanding accountability, or collectively reporting corruption, individuals are less exposed to retaliation.[xx] Such coalitions also enhance legitimacy, as they demonstrate that anti-corruption demands are not isolated but reflect broader societal consensus. The creation of village-level or ward-level anti-corruption committees could help institutionalize this approach, embedding accountability within the wantok system rather than against it.[xxi]

Enhance Institutional Effectiveness

The establishment of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) raised hopes for a transformative accountability institution. Yet without prosecutorial authority, ICAC risks becoming toothless. Citizens are acutely aware of this danger, often referring to “laws without teeth.” Granting ICAC the power to lay charges, coupled with a dedicated anti-corruption bench within the judiciary, would demonstrate seriousness in tackling high-level corruption. Adequate funding is equally critical: ICAC must have resources to recruit skilled investigators, maintain offices in provinces, and conduct independent operations free of political pressure.[xxii]

Fragmentation among anti-corruption institutions weakens effectiveness. For example, the Ombudsman Commission has investigative powers but lacks enforcement reach, while the police fraud squad suffers from underfunding and interference. ICAC should serve as the hub that coordinates these efforts, ensuring seamless information sharing and reducing duplication. Formal mechanisms such as memorandum of understanding and joint task forces can strengthen collaboration. Importantly, civil society actors should also be integrated into this framework, providing community feedback and monitoring to keep institutions accountable to citizens.[xxiii]

Invest in Civic Education and Awareness

Citizens in remote and rural communities often lack access to information about what corruption is, why it matters, and how to report it. Outreach programs must therefore go beyond urban centres to reach the rural majority. This can involve mobile education campaigns, radio broadcasts in local languages, and partnerships with churches and schools to spread anti-corruption messages. By localizing awareness, citizens are empowered to see corruption not as an abstract issue but as something that directly affects their access to services and livelihoods.

Sustainable cultural change requires intergenerational strategies.[xxiv] Incorporating anti-corruption modules into primary and secondary school curricula can normalize values of honesty, fairness, and accountability from childhood. Beyond schools, community trainings can target youth groups, women’s organizations, and professional associations, equipping them with practical knowledge on how to recognize and challenge corruption. Such initiatives not only build awareness but also cultivate a politically conscious citizenry capable of demanding reform over the long term.[xxv]

6. Regional Lessons for the Pacific

Pacific Island countries (PICs) should recognize the security dimensions of corruption and integrate anti-corruption into regional security frameworks. Corruption is often viewed as a governance or development issue, but in fragile states like PNG it has direct implications for security. When corruption erodes legitimacy and weakens institutions, it fosters instability that can spill across borders, including through transnational crime and resource insecurity. Pacific Island states should therefore broaden their understanding of security to explicitly include anti-corruption. Regional frameworks, such as the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, could incorporate anti-corruption benchmarks and peer review mechanisms.

Lessons from PNG underscore the importance of coupling legal reform with protection mechanisms and community empowerment. Other Pacific states considering anti-corruption reforms should recognize that passing new laws, while necessary, is insufficient. PNG’s experience illustrates that without effective implementation, enforcement capacity, and credible protection for whistleblowers, legal reforms risk deepening public cynicism. Equally, reforms must be anchored in community engagement, ensuring that laws resonate with cultural realities and that citizens feel ownership of accountability processes. In this way, PNG’s struggle offers a cautionary tale but also a roadmap for regional partners seeking to align governance, development, and security goals.

Conclusion

The four recommendations address corruption in Papua New Guinea by targeting both principal–agent and collective action failures. Corruption in Papua New Guinea persists because officials face weak oversight and citizens act in isolation. Protecting whistleblowers improves detection, collective community action reduces fear of retaliation, stronger institutions make punishment credible, and civic education builds long-term demand for accountability. Together, these measures can turn citizens into effective watchdogs and make corruption riskier and less socially acceptable. The struggle against corruption in Papua New Guinea is a struggle between hope and pessimism. Citizens know that reporting corruption can yield transformative benefits for governance, service delivery, the economy, and democracy. Yet they also recognize the real dangers including security threats, social exclusion, and economic hardship that accompany such actions.

This ambivalence reflects not a lack of civic will, but the fragility of state institutions tasked with protecting whistleblowers and enforcing accountability. Until these institutions demonstrate independence, effectiveness, and capacity, citizens will continue to face impossible choices between doing what is right and preserving their safety and livelihood.

For PNG, the stakes could not be higher. Corruption undermines not only development but also security, legitimacy, and stability. For the Pacific region, PNG’s experience is a reminder that corruption is not only a governance issue but a security challenge with far-reaching implications. Bridging the gap between hope and pessimism is thus central not only to PNG’s democratic future but to the collective security of the Pacific.

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[i] Huffer, E. (2005). Governance, corruption and ethics in the Pacific. Contemporary Pacific, 17 (1), 118–40. https://doi.org/10.1353/cp.2005.0014.

[ii] World Bank. (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. New York: World Bank.

[iii] Transparency International. (n.d.). What is corruption? www.transparency.org/en/whatis-corruption.

[iv] Winn, T.E. (2025). Investigating corruption in Papua New Guinea through the patron-client structure: the citizens’ perceptions. PhD thesis, James Cook University. doi:  https://doi.org/10.25903/0r9x-wh87.

[v] Walton, G. (2016). Silent screams and muffled cries: The ineffectiveness of anticorruption measures in Papua New Guinea. Asian Education and Development Studies, 5(2), 211-226. https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-01-2016-0005.

[vi] Dix, S & Pok, E. (2009). Combating Corruption in Traditional Societies: Papua New Guinea. In R. I. Rotberg (Eds.), Corruption, global security, and world order (pp. 239-259). Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation and American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

[vii] Winn, T. (2025). Security cooperation to combat corruption in the Pacific: A regional approach. In J. Wallis, H. McNeill, J. Batley, & A. Powles (Eds.), Security cooperation in the Pacific Islands: Politics, priorities, and pathways of the regional security patchwork (pp. 278-294). London & New York: Routledge.

[viii] Marquette, H., & Peiffer, C. (2018). Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real‐world” functions. Governance, 31(3), 499-514. doi:10.1111/gove.12311.

[ix] Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail – systemic corruption as a collective action problem. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 26(3), 449-471. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x.

[x] Peiffer, C., & Walton, G. (2018). Overcoming collective action problems through anticorruption messages, Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper 77, Crawford School of Public Policy, Canberra: The Australian National University.

[xi] Joshi, A. (2013). Do They Work? Assessing the Impact of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives in Service Delivery. Development Policy Review, 31(s1), s29–s48. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12018.

[xii] Morris, S. D., & Klesner, J. L. (2010). Corruption and trust: Theoretical considerations and evidence from Mexico. Comparative Political Studies, 43(10), 1258-1285. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010369072.

[xiii] Sakib, N. H. (2022). Community organizing in anti-corruption initiatives through spontaneous participation: Bangladesh perspective. Community Development Journal, 57(2), 360–379. https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsaa027.

[xiv] Walton, G. W. (2016). Silent screams and muffled cries: The ineffectiveness of anti-corruption measures in Papua New Guinea. Asian Education and Development Studies, 5 (2), 211–226. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-01-2016-0005.

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