On March 27, 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth visited Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. During his short visit, Hegseth emphasized the island’s strategic value,

These islands are the tip of America’s sphere in the Pacific. Guam and CNMI are vital parts of America and central to our defense mission.[1]

Guam, a proclaimed cornerstone of deterrence, was Hegseth’s second stop on his tour to reassure Indo-Pacific allies that the United States remains committed to the region. More than reassurance, Hegseth’s tour illuminated the Trump Administration’s emerging Pacific strategy: re-establish deterrence, offload regional security burdens to allies, and deepen strategic dependency on US-affiliated Micronesia.

Achieving this deterrence strategy depends on leveraging US territories such as Guam and the CNMI, as well as the freely associated states, valuable for both their formal political relationships with the US and their proximity to Asia. In this sense, close political affiliation with the US and geographic proximity to Asia become Micronesia’s raison d’être in US regional strategy. This emphasis on islands in Micronesia as the tip of the American military’s spear means the US will receive sustained attention, in one way or the other. Yet, the same cannot be said of the rest of the Pacific Islands.

Herein lies a central challenge of analyzing US Pacific Islands policy. First, as I have argued elsewhere: “The Trump Administration’s Asia-Pacific policy is still unfolding and may not be completely clear for some time.”[2] Second, “Which Pacific Islands are you talking about?” This question, while relevant under Trump, is not new or unique. Every US presidential administration since the “Asia-Pacific Pivot” has struggled with this ambiguity. Guam, the CNMI, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands maintain unique, formalized relationships with the US. Guam has been a colony of the US since the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, and the US administered the others after World War II as part of the United Nations’ Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. These islands regularly interact with the US federal government and are areas of strategic denial for the military. The rest of the Pacific Islands have historical, colonial ties with other powers, and many are further from Asia. Any assessment of Trump’s Pacific policy, then, must begin with this fundamental distinction. Simply put, what the US does in Micronesia is not always what it does elsewhere in the Pacific Islands.

In this piece, I discuss US military policy that disproportionately affects U.S-affiliated Micronesia and how this may continue under the new administration. Then, I discuss themes that affect the Pacific Islands as a whole such as the decline of soft power. Lastly, I argue that the US military may become the dominant face of American presence in the Pacific, at large.

 

 1. Hard Power, Deterrence, and Micronesia

 

The increasing capacity of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has led the US military to pivot to more distributed and dispersed operations. The goal of distribution and dispersal, such as the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment, is for the US to become operationally predictable and tactically unpredictable.[3] “US military emphasis on distribution and dispersal then, is predicated on having both enduring locations (which support ongoing activities and interests on a permanent basis) as well as contingency locations (which provide temporary support for contingency operations).”[4] This reposturing is reflected in Hegseth’s reason for touring the region: gauge the commitment of US Indo-Pacific allies. The US cannot be certain that their allies will allow the use of their countries during a conflict with China. For example, Major General Francisco Lorenzo Jr. of the Philippine Armed Forces recently said,

The Philippines has renounced war as a means of its national policy. So, if ever there will be conflict in Taiwan, the Philippines will not participate.[5]

There is also ambiguity about Japan and South Korea allowing US access.[6] Yet, the unique arrangements the US has with its territories and the freely associated states means the US can rely on these islands for access, without political headache. In a world where the US has “changed from liberator to a landlord seeking rent,”[7] these agreements in Micronesia provide reliable forward projection for the US.

Both the first Trump administration and the Biden administration began the process of using other islands in Micronesia as contingency locations if Guam (Andersen Air Force Base) becomes compromised.[8] The second Trump administration is continuing these efforts. During his visit to Guam, Hegseth met with President Simina of the Federated States of Micronesia where they reached an understanding for the US to move forward with planned projects in Yap, with future investments said to exceed $2 billion. In a Joint Statement by the US and FSM governments, they write, “These projects are designed to provide strategic operational and exercise capabilities for U.S. forces. These projects will strengthen our deterrence and regional posture and ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.”[9] The proposed projects in Yap include extending the runway at Yap International Airport to be used as a divert location because as it stands, the runway is too short to support military aircraft operations. Additionally, the FY25 budget justification specifically states these projects will help ensure mission requirements are met in case other “western” Pacific locations are limited or denied.[10]

There is also the divert airfield being built in Tinian in the CNMI (which is roughly 65% completed) to act as a backup if Guam is no longer usable. The US military is restoring the two major runways in Tinian’s North Field (which was used during World War II).  Also relevant here is recent news of military plans for the other two main islands of the CNMI, Saipan and Rota (also known as Luta).[11] After a closed-door meeting with Hegseth, CNMI Governor Arnold Palacios, told the media the US military is “looking at a concept to build very passive property facilities in Rota and Saipan, such as storage, warehousing and fuel” with plans to also expand the aprons at Rota and Saipan airports to accommodate heavier aircraft.[12] These contingency sites reflect a wider effort to establish a distributed operational footprint across U.S.-affiliated Micronesia.

The rationale behind military investments in Tinian, Rota, and Yap ultimately circles back to Guam: the strategic hub whose vulnerability necessitates this distributed build-up. The US knows that Guam is becoming vulnerable and no longer wants to place all of its eggs in one second island chain basket. As the center of the second island chain, it is highly likely that the Trump administration will continue to build up Guam’s military capabilities, inclusive of the Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (EIAMDS). The EIAMDS, an amalgam of missile defense technologies from different services, is being presented to Guam as 360-degree protection from incoming missile attacks to the island. This integration of disparate systems, still unproven at scale, is not only experimental but signals Guam’s role as a testing ground for layered missile defense under live conditions. Hegseth spoke of the EIAMDS, saying, “We got the Guam defense system, which is a model for the Golden Dome….we’re going to learn a lot here.”[13] The Guam Cluster is being prepared for its role in a potential conflict with China. This is likely to remain during this second Trump administration.

Washington’s foreign policy in the region may disproportionately affect US-affiliated Micronesia, but the rest of the islands know they are not immune. US strategic movements may create ripple effects too large to be contained, reaching shores across the Pacific. The premier regional organization in the Pacific Islands, the Pacific Islands Forum, released their “Pacific Security Outlook Report,” outlining the region’s top security challenges. The effects of geopolitics were emphasized. “Dynamic geopolitical competition will continue … US-China competition will continue to result in flow-on impacts for the Pacific … Although of a distance from each of these theatres, the Pacific remains firmly connected to any future outcomes.”[14] The forum is rightfully concerned with the risks of miscalculation that can spill over. Potential kinetic conflict or even the preparation for potential kinetic conflict involving the South China Sea or Taiwan will involve Guam and the rest of the Northern Pacific. It is not difficult to imagine conflict proliferating because major powers completely misperceive the intention, resolve, or capability of the other or because of reputational costs of backing down from commitments, thus leading to the loss of credibility. The Pacific must continue to pay close attention to Micronesia as events in the subregion may be a crystal ball for the trajectory of strategic competition.

 

2. Misaligned security: Oceania and “America First”

 

Overall, there are signals that the Trump administration will continue to use Micronesia for hard power in the region. Beyond this, the Trump administration seems to be causing global anxiety due to the unpredictability and quick pace of what seems like chaotic decision-making. Some worry the Trump administration is eroding “trust and partnership” built up over generations between the US and other countries.[15] Even the US’s strongest supporters in the Pacific, like President Whipps of Palau, seem to be experiencing some level of anxiety over the direction of the White House. Whipps recently said on US policy,

I hope that it is a retreat, reassess, then come back stronger. It has been a bumpy road, cutting USAID and other activities, but I like to think positive.[16]

The future of US Pacific Islands policy remains unclear. However, the priorities of the Trump administration and the priorities of the Pacific Islands are arguably misaligned.

Nowhere is this misalignment clearer than in the realm of climate change, the Pacific’s foremost existential concern. Climate change remains the greatest threat to the Pacific’s security[17] and Pacific leaders are acutely aware that climate change has become politically taboo within the Trump administration. The PIF acknowledged the role that Trump would play in stalling global progress on climate change. “With Donald Trump resuming the US Presidency in January, Pacific countries may need to work harder and in concert with others, both inside and outside the region, to ensure that progress continues to be made.”[18] Along with climate change, human security threats resulting from disasters/food/health security, transnational crime, environmental security, cyber security, traditional security, and economic security remain primary concerns for the region. The Pacific knows that climate change will exacerbate environmental problems that will in turn exacerbate human security issues such as food security, thus complicating the prospects of economic development.

Overall, the PIF acknowledges how Trump’s policies may affect the region. The Pacific must track not only Trump’s direct engagements with the region but also the broader effects of his foreign and domestic policies. Many of the Trump administration’s “America First” actions misalign with Pacific Islands security concerns.

The first 100 days of the Trump administration are damaging the US’s relationship with the Pacific. The White House’s early actions are an erosion of US soft power in the region, undermining long-standing institutions and partnerships. One of the first actions taken was the dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). During the Biden administration, USAID was being strengthened to help the US compete against China in the region. Biden opened a USAID office in Fiji and established the Pacific-American Climate Fund to help the islands deal with climate change through grants and loans to local organizations, providing a collective US$3.4 billion to the Pacific. However, Trump has almost entirely dismantled USAID with plans to absorb the agency into the State department, cut up to 80% of USAID programs, and cut personnel down to 15 positions.[19] These cuts have paused programs in the Pacific related to climate resilience and economic growth. Fiji’s Permanent Secretary for Environment and Climate Change expressed uncertainty, “As well as their withdrawal of aid towards the Pacific, it has multifaceted challenges, particularly for development partners that rely on US aid to implement some of the projects.”[20] This has led Fiji to look for more partners in the climate space. As Anna Powles astutely notes, “The insecurity that this is creating in the region over the impact on much smaller, but key programmes is something which is concerning everyone deeply across the Pacific.”[21]

The administration is also decreasing other avenues of soft power such as the East-West Center (EWC) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). EWC has been a steady, positive US arm in the islands. The center has the Pacific Islands Development Program which hosts important leadership programs like the Resilient Pacific Islands Leaders Fellowship and the Pacific Islands Leadership Program. EWC also offers scholarships such as the US South Pacific Scholarship Program. The center gets more than half of its operating budget from federal funding sources such as the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The future of the center is uncertain as there are Trump administration budget proposals that provide no money to the EWC.[22] This is tied to larger proposals to restructure the State Department in general, from eliminating 132 offices (some being absorbed into other parts of the department) and consolidating region-specific functions.[23]

The Trump administration is also withdrawing from multilateral agreements and institutions that the Pacific views as important. Hours after taking office, President Trump began the process of withdrawing the US from the Paris climate accord (which he also did during his first term), claiming that it is an unfair agreement. Pacific leaders, unsurprisingly, were disappointed with this decision with Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister calling the decision “totally irresponsible” and “morally wrong.”[24] President Trump also signed orders withdrawing the country from the Human Rights Council, the World Health Organization, and calling for a review of US engagement in international fora. Depending on this review, the US may continue to withdraw or decrease support for agreements or organizations of importance to the Pacific.

Collectively, the signal being sent to the Pacific Islands is that the US is an unreliable partner. While congressional inertia may temper some executive overreach, the erosion of diplomatic institutions and regional goodwill occurs at the level of tone, emphasis, and perception, areas the executive branch controls. The signal sent is not to place too much faith in the promises of a US administration, as someone four years later can reverse the trajectory of progress. The reality is that the US was already behind the curve during the Biden administration as the renewal of the economic provisions of the Compacts of Free Association and promised money to the Pacific stalled in Congress. Creating a Pacific Partnership Strategy and hosting Pacific Leaders in Washington were attempts to catch up with the depth of relationships many of these countries had with China. The inconsistency in US engagement reinforces a message to Pacific leaders: American partnership may be conditional, unreliable, and short-term. In a region where relationships matter, the US is going down a path that may do long-term damage to its long-term influence in the Pacific. As one Pacific diplomat remarked, “The Pacific needs predictability in all our cooperation with everyone.”[25]

This does not mean that the Trump administration will not or cannot re-establish or strengthen relationships with the Pacific. It is too early to tell. Trump Cabinet officials have said that “America First” does not mean “America Alone.” But these first 100 days are not painting a good picture of what is to come. But the paint may not be dry yet. Only time will tell.

 

3. The Dominant US face in the Pacific is in uniform

 

This leaves the pivotal question: With the decline of soft power and diplomacy, who will be the US face in the Pacific? Robert Underwood, Chairperson of the Pacific Center for Island Security and former Guam Delegate to US Congress, makes a compelling case that it will be the US military. He writes,

The American face in the islands used to include sympathetic civil servants, some eager entrepreneurs and American migrants eager to find a new way of life in a calmer and stable environment. Today the American face is likely to be in a military uniform – not an unfamiliar role, but again almost entirely dominant in the relationships between the U.S. and its territories as well as the freely associated states.[26] [Emphasis added]

There is a case to be made that the face of the Trump Administration in the Pacific may be in uniform. If hard power has supplanted soft power as Washington’s primary instrument in the Pacific, then the Department of Defense (DOD) may just become the most dominant US presence in the Pacific, or rather the remnants of US reliability in the region. For example, amidst news of cuts to USAID projects in the Pacific and tariffs, the US announced a US$400 million investment for a large-scale fuel storage facility near Port Moresby awarded by the DOD.[27] It is no coincidence that this investment is occurring in a country that signed a defense agreement with the US in 2023 and where the US military now has access to six sites. Papua New Guinea is becoming strategically important to the United States again, and the US DOD will reportedly spend more than US$864 million on infrastructure development and military training.[28]

The signal being sent to the Pacific is that US military agreements bring economic development. To return to Micronesia, in the CNMI, the U.S. military presence in Tinian, is often regarded as a significant economic driver. Local leaders have emphasized the positive economic impact of these military projects from staying in hotels, renting vehicles, and eating at restaurants. Similarly, in Palau, President Whipps says that military activity provides another source of economic activity as it “builds up hotels, it provides work and more stability.”[29]

In this way, it seems some in the DOD hierarchy understand the ways the military can exert influence in the region. Admiral Paparo of the US Indo-Pacific Command said he would advocate for aid for the South Pacific amidst the USAID review because he does not want China to seize the opportunity to fill the void.[30] Former head of INDOPACOM, Admiral Aquilino, said something similar regarding the Guam Cluster, “USINDOPACOM has worked diligently to build local political support across the region. … The national and territorial governments have welcomed the increased transparent communications and our willingness to incorporate local concerns into our plans.”[31] This could lead Pacific Island leaders to welcome US military partnerships and developments. A former DOD official who ran the Joint Guam Program Office blatantly stated this:

I think it’s going to be very positive because when other island communities start seeing what’s happening in Guam, they will be attracted to the United States. U.S. interests are reaching out into other island communities and hoping to influence them and bring them into the sphere of political, economic and sometimes military influence throughout the whole world.[32]

In this sense, US military developments in territories like Guam are not only disproportionately carrying the burden of US military interests in the Indo-Pacific but also influence and attraction. Guam, in effect, becomes a demonstration site, showing other islands that US military presence can be both a partner and an economic patron.

The other signal being sent is that the islands’ geostrategic importance and ability to help the US deter China may be the only language the US understands. There are two lessons to be learned.

The first is that under the Trump administration, Pacific Island leaders may feel the need to frame the Pacific’s critical issues, such as economic development or human security, into the language of geopolitical interest if they want anything from the US. Conversely, the US may continue to present military projects as a boon to economies and infrastructure. In this way, economic development, infrastructure, and technical assistance can become the trojan horse for US military expansion in the islands. In aid-starved environments, US military investment can appear as a drink of water in a development desert, welcome, but not without long-term consequences. Acknowledging the local economic benefits of US military investment is not the same as endorsing the long-term securitization of development. The military is playing into an environment of underdevelopment (further exacerbated by the withdrawal of soft power programs). Thus, the Pacific must ask: investment on whose terms, and for whose ends?

This was seen under the Biden Administration with the renewal of the economic provisions of the Compacts of Free Association, which were finally signed in early 2024 after months of stalling by Congress. The rush to get these provisions renewed was an anxiety-riddled process. As Congress continued to stall, pressure was put on Congress by multiple parties to sign the compacts or cede this space to Chinese influence. Leaders in the COFA states repeated the China threat rhetoric. It is hard to blame the COFA leaders for using the China rhetoric as it seems that China is the only language that the United States speaks right now. However, the caution is in ramping up this rhetoric as the core reason for economic renewal. What would US policy be like when it comes to another economic renewal in 20 years, if the China threat is different? Would the US then decide to not renew these economic provisions? By tying the China threat rhetoric to the renewals, it further ties economic funding to geopolitics more tightly. This is a potential trap that may lead to requesting for military presence and infrastructure in the islands in the name of economic development.

Security for the islands then becomes deeply entangled with speaking the language of military strategy. There is a real risk that Pacific development and security priorities will become fully subsumed into US strategic logic and securitized in ways that constrain future agency. Even if the Pacific rightfully needs to maximize benefit in the current geopolitical moment, making military expansionism a long-term vehicle for critical Pacific security issues should be seriously analyzed and debated. As Tarcisius Kabutaulaka notes, “But whatever the fate of these agreements, Pacific Island countries should expect Trump to pursue a more transactional relationship, framed by the view that Pacific Islands are pawns in US security agendas, and to counter China.”[33] One saw the transactional nature of the US through the tariffs which were placed on many Pacific states. In this iteration, military and security agreements may be the currency of transactions. By securitizing developmental aid and tying financial support to great-power competition, the US risks establishing a precedent where future aid is contingent not on need or shared values, but on strategic calculus alone. Even if the US has a strategic imperative, it must pair hard power with long-term investments in diplomacy, trust, and Pacific priorities like climate resilience.

The second lesson to learn from the Guam example is that even if islands were to use a militarized or geopolitical framing, it is not clear the Trump Administration will listen or oblige. Republican senators in the Guam legislature wrote an urgent letter to Trump for “Consideration amidst Guam military buildup & spending reductions and realignment.” In the letter, they express concern with the cuts to federal programs for Guam’s public services, education, disaster preparedness, and healthcare. They point out the discrepancy between federal cuts and the island’s ability to host US military expansion.

Further cuts could strain local infrastructure, disrupt development initiatives, and compromise the ability to support and sustain the military buildup effectively. Without adequate federal support, these pressures may impede Guam’s capacity to continue serving as a reliable and resilient host for U.S. military operations.[34]

From Guam, we learn that even if the dominant American face in the Pacific wears a uniform, it is unclear what it carries, be it support, stability or further strain. Guam’s experience shows that these military-driven economic development approaches are to develop military capacity and not necessarily sustainable local development. The benefits of military development may be episodic. Thus, it is unclear whether resources, respect, and the resilience the islands seek will be brought to the table. Many have rightfully noted that the Trump Administration’s actions to date are leaving vacuums for others to fill, from China to Australia. Others may bring different partnerships, arguing that they are more aligned with Pacific priorities.

Ultimately, the first 100 days of the Trump Administration’s actions in the Pacific reaffirm a pattern: military and strategic attention coupled with the withering of diplomatic, multilateral, and developmental presence. While the challenges between US and Pacific engagement did not start with the Trump administration, these first 100 days signal a regression with the undoing of diplomatic gains. The US needs to be reminded that the Pacific is not without its choices. The Pacific Islands have agency. They are moving forward. The Pacific’s trajectory is not derailed by American absence. Its diplomatic train continues down its own track, with or without US passengers. If the American face in the Pacific remains exclusively in uniform, it may find fewer friends, less legitimacy, and a diminishing role in shaping the region’s future. The region will be respected. The Pacific must ride this wave and not let geopolitical and strategic considerations fracture its collective, regional voice. The Pacific must return to core principles and hold steadfast, despite who is in power. The Pacific must continue to choose, not wait to be chosen.

 

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[1] KUAM News, “Sec. Hegseth: We are not seeking war with Communist China, but it is our job to ensure that we are ready,” March 27, 2025, accessed at https://www.kuam.com/story/52632270/secy-hegseth-we-are-not-seeking-war-with-communist-china-but-it-is-our-job-to-ensure-that-we-are-ready

[2] Ken Kuper, Leland Bettis, and Robert Underwood, “The signal Guam sends to US regional allies,” Guam Daily Post, April 15, accessed at https://www.postguam.com/forum/featured_columnists/the-signal-guam-sends-to-us-regional-allies/article_e2938f32-ecfc-43dc-b3b1-d71d8ff3c1c4.html

[3] Miranda Priebe, Alan J. Vick, Jacob L. Heim, Meagan L. Smith, “Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment: Implications for USAF Force Presentation,” RAND Corporation, 2019.

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